one is choosing in fact coherent? I think not. But for the purposes of this paper, I shall assume, as I have said, that such free choices are in themselves perfectly coherent (even if finally impossible for the reason that God would necessarily prevent them). My purpose here is to examine the kinds of providential control that might be compatible with libertarian free will; in particular, I
want to consider the options that an omnipotent and omniscient God might have had in creating free persons and how we might expect a loving God to have dealt with them.
I shall begin with this question: Is it possible that God was powerless to create a universe (or to make actual a world) of free agents all of whom are, of their own free will, eventually reconciled to him? How one answers this question will depend, at least in part, on how one conceives of divine omniscience, a matter about which contemporary philosophers disagree. So let us begin with some distinctions. Let us say that God has simple foreknowledge if he knows every future event, including every future choice of every free agent, and let us say that God has middle knowledge if, in addition to his simple foreknowledge, he knows the truth value (either true or false) of such counterfactuals as these:
(1) If Servetus had not been burned at the stake and had been allowed to live, he would have forgiven those who accused him unjustly in Geneva.
(2) If Don Coe were to win the Oregon lottery next year (and the other circumstances of his life were to remain roughly the same as they are now), he would make a sizeable contribution to the American Philosophical Association.
Middle knowledge, then, includes far more than simple foreknowledge; it includes a knowledge of how every possible free agent would act in every possible set of circumstances. Of course many philosophers deny that middle knowledge is truly possible, 4 and others deny that even simple foreknowledge is compatible with free will; 5 but it is not my purpose here to settle such disputes as these. Instead, I shall examine the implications of three possible views: (1) the view, increasingly popular today, that God has neither middle knowledge nor a simple foreknowledge of future contingencies; (2) the view, often associated with De Molina, that God has middle knowledge as well as a simple foreknowledge of future contingencies; and (3) the view, which has received little attention, that God has a simple foreknowledge of future contingencies but no middle knowledge.
I shall argue that, regardless of which view a theist adopts, we have no reason to think (RH) even possibly true.
II. Providence Without Foreknowledge
Increasingly popular today, as I have said, is the view that God is omniscient in this sense:
he knows all that it is logically possible to know, but neither middle knowledge nor a simple foreknowledge of future contingencies is a possible form of knowledge. Such a view is compatible, perhaps, with the possibility that God cannot both leave all created persons free and reconcile all of them to himself; but that should provide little comfort for those who claim that (RH) is possibly true.
In the first place, given such a view, neither God nor anyone else can now know that (RH) is true; that is, neither God nor anyone else can now know that some persons will not only freely reject God but also freely sustain a commitment to such rejection in the face of all that omnipotent love might do in the future to change their minds. If you deny foreknowledge of God, therefore, you cannot consistently hold, at the same time, that some free persons, those condemned to hell, are somehow beyond any hope of restoration; for however corrupt and rebellious a sinner might become and however many ages might pass, an infinity of hope would remain that God will yet find a way to restore that sinner to repentance and life and to do so without interfering with (what might remain of) that sinner's freedom of will. Nothing short of the certain knowledge that God will never achieve such reconciliation, in other words, could possibly remove all hope for it.
But more than that. If God is essentially omniscient but has no knowledge of future con- S is choosing. In the latter case, even where S chooses to give up S's own freedom (whatever exactly that might mean) and is fully responsible for that choice, a loving God who later removes S's ignorance of the true nature of S's choice and restores S to freedom, perhaps using the consequences of S's own choice as a means of doing both, would not in that way disregard S's freedom but thereby pay it the highest respect. Only in the former case, therefore, would the question of wanted what the addict thought he wanted. That is because we often think we want certain ends until we achieve them; then we discover that we never really wanted them at all. 6 In order for our pursuit of an end to be fully informed, therefore, we must know with certainty what judgment we would make if perchance we should achieve it. And the same is true for God; in order for God to know that our pursuit of some end is fully informed, he must know what judgment we would make if perchance we should achieve it. So how could a God without middle knowledge now know that some persons have already made a fully informed decision to reject him and to give up their own freedom forever? The answer is that he could not know this, because he could not now have reason to believe that, if restored to freedom at some future time, those who have indeed rejected him for a season would continue to do so in the future. And that point seems to me decisive. For the very reason that in the absence of middle knowledge God could never know that (RH) is true, neither could he ever have reason to believe that some sinner had already made a fully informed decision to reject him forever.
I conclude, therefore, that if God has neither middle knowledge nor a simple foreknowledge of future contingencies, then neither God nor anyone else could ever have reason to believe that some sinners are beyond the possibility of restoration; nor could anyone have reason to believe that (RH) is true; nor would (RH) in fact be true; nor would it be so much as possible that (RH) is true. If God is perfectly loving, moreover, he would never give up on any of his loved ones, however corrupt some of them might become and however far they might stray from him.
III. Providence with Middle Knowledge
I now turn to the assumption that God has middle knowledge as well as a simple foreknowledge of future contingencies. Given this view of divine omniscience, God retains a good deal of providential control over created free persons, even though he does not, so to speak, cause it to be the case that a free person wills in a given way. God may not bring about a person's free actions in Plantinga's strong sense, but he does bring them about in Plantinga's weak sense. 7 Suppose, for example, that each of the following subjunctive conditionals is true:
(4) If God were to subject Smith to experiences A, B, and C, then Smith would freely repent of all wrong doing.
(5) If God were to subject Smith to experiences A and B but not C, then Smith would freely refuse to repent of all wrong doing.
If God knows that (4) and (5) are both true, he is in a position both to bring it about (weakly) that
Smith freely repents of all wrong doing and to bring it about (weakly) that Smith freely refuses to repent of all wrong doing. We might imagine that C involves a special form of punishment that God knows to be particularly well suited for Smith's personality; but though C provides an occasion for Smith to repent and in fact influences Smith in that direction, it is neither a sufficient cause of, nor a member of a set of conditions causally sufficient for, such repentance. The assumption here is that Smith is truly free (in a sense incompatible with determinism) but that God also knows the conditions under which Smith would freely repent of all wrong doing. And if God has such knowledge, he can presumably act upon it in his effort to bring reconciliation to a fallen world. 9 God would know whether that person was in fact redeemable (not because transworld reprobation is an essential property of the person possessing it, a property in the essence, but because it is an accidental property of the essence). Accordingly, where a creaturely essence is one whose instantiation would be a created free agent, we can also say:
(D2) A creaturely essence E suffers from transworld reprobation if, and only if, every possible world in which the instantiation of E faces one or more moral choices and either (a) always freely chooses rightly or (b) eventually and freely repents of all wrong doing is a world that God is powerless to make actual. It is possible that the terrible price of filling heaven is also filling hell and that in any other possible world which was feasible for God the balance between saved and lost was worse. It is possible that had God actualized a world in which there are less persons in hell, there would also have been less persons in heaven. It is possible that in order to achieve this much blessedness, God was forced to accept this much loss. 10 According to Craig, then, God's purpose is to produce an optimal balance between saved and unsaved; that is, he wants to include as many as he can in the company of the redeemed and to eliminate as many as he can from the company of the damned. But it is possible, says Craig, that had God made actual a world in which fewer persons are damned, he would also have had to settle for a smaller company of the redeemed. So Craig's idea is this: It is possible that God instantiated some essences that suffer from transworld reprobation (or transworld damnation, as he calls it) as a "terrible price" for filling heaven; it is possible, in other words, that (6) God has actualized a world containing an optimal balance between saved and unsaved, one in which some persons are unsaved and those who are unsaved suffer from transworld reprobation.
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In that way, God damns only those whom he never could have saved anyway, and in damning them he supposedly manages to save more than he otherwise could have saved.
But are all of these alleged possibilities genuine? Is it possible, for example, that even some creaturely essences should suffer from transworld reprobation? I am persuaded, for reasons similar to those mentioned in the Introduction, that this is not possible. Once we fully think through the concepts of freedom and power and moral corruption, we shall come to see that the very concept of an irredeemable person is deeply incoherent. 12 Compare the idea of an irredeemable person, or that of transworld reprobation, with Plantinga's idea of transworld depravity. It seems entirely possible that, in every feasible world which includes the instantiation of some creaturely essence E, the instantiation of E slips up at least once; this may even seem probable if you believe, as I do, that a degree of ambiguity, separation, and blindness is an essential element in the process by which God creates a free, independent, and rational agent. I see no reason to think it even possible, however, that in every feasible world which includes the instantiation of E, the instantiation of E freely chooses eternal damnation and therefore eternal misery for itself. With respect to any rational agent S, it is, I should think, within God's power to impart to S (over time) a
clear revelation of what separation from God would entail; it is therefore within his power to remove all of the ignorance and to shatter all of the illusions that make evil choices possible in the first place. And if that is true, then there are, for any given person S, feasible worlds in which God undermines (over time) every possible motive that S might have for rejecting him. As I understand the Christian view, moreover, a fundamental "contradiction" exists on the side of evil and a fundamental asymmetry exists in the relationship between good and evil. Though it is quite possible that someone should continue freely to choose the good for an indefinite period of time, it is not possible that someone should continue freely to choose evil; over the long run (by which I mean to include the afterlife) evil will always undermine and destroy itself. Neither, it seems to me, is it possible that, because certain "counterfactuals of freedom" are true, the salvation of one person, or even that of a given combination of persons, might "require," from the perspective of God's providential control, the damnation of other persons; at least this is not possible, I shall suggest below, if salvation provides a guarantee of future blessedness. For the present, however, I shall concede the possibility that some creaturely essences suffer from transworld reprobation, the possibility that all of them suffer from it, the possibility that no created persons would freely enter into everlasting fellowship with God unless some should experience everlasting damnation, and even the possibility that the number of the redeemed in heaven "depends," in the way that
Craig suggests, upon the number of the damned in hell. We must still ask how a loving and om- That is also why a loving God would never engineer the damnation of some of those he could have saved, some who do not suffer from transworld reprobation, in order to save others.
According to Craig:
one could argue that so long as people receive sufficient grace for salvation in whatever circumstances they are, then they are responsible for their response in such circumstances and cannot complain that had they been in different circumstances, then their reaction would have been different. 15 But that misses the point altogether. The issue is not whether the damned are responsible for their damnation; the issue is whether God would permit some people to damn themselves and thereby to do irreparable harm to others. Consider again David, our high school dropout who becomes addicted to heroin. As we assumed in the previous section, David is fully responsible for his addiction; he had sufficient grace, if you will, to avoid it. But however responsible he may have been for it-indeed, just because he is responsible for it-his addiction will bring indescrib- (D3) God brings salvation to a sinner S only if, among other things, God brings it about (weakly) that the following conditions obtain: (a) that S is reconciled to God and in a state of supreme happiness, (b) that S is filled with love for others and therefore desires the good for all other created persons, and (c) that there is no fact F such that (i) S is ignorant of F and (ii) were S not ignorant of F, then S would have been unable to experience supreme happiness.
The idea behind condition (c) is that salvation brings not only happiness, but the kind of happiness that could survive a full disclosure of facts; the blessedness of those in heaven is not merely, in other words, a blissful kind of ignorance. But then, if salvation requires that each of the conditions in (D3) be met, the damnation of one person could not possibly contribute to the salvation of others; to the contrary, it would necessarily undermine such salvation.
Here is why. For any two persons, S and S*, if S is eternally damned and is therefore destined to be eternally miserable, then either S* is aware of S's miserable condition or S* is not aware of it. If, on the one hand, S is eternally damned and S* is aware of S's miserable condition, then either (1) S* does not truly love, or desire the good for, S or (2) S* cannot be happy knowing that S will be forever miserable. If (1) is the case, then S* does not meet condition (b) of (D3); and if (2) is the case, then S* does not meet condition (a). So if S is eternally damned and S* is aware of S's miserable condition, then God cannot, given (D3), bring salvation to S*. If, on the other hand, S is eternally damned and S* is not aware of S's miserable condition, then either (2) is the case, then S* does not meet condition (b) of (D3). So even if S is eternally damned and S* is not aware of S's miserable condition, God still cannot bring salvation (of the relevant kind) to S*. Accordingly, for any two persons, S and S*, if S is eternally damned and therefore destined to be eternally miserable, then God cannot bring salvation to S*.
We are now in a position to see exactly why Craig's defense of the traditional doctrine of hell is unsuccessful. According to Craig, (6) God has actualized a world containing an optimal balance between saved and unsaved, one in which some persons are unsaved and those who are unsaved suffer from transworld reprobation, is at least possibly true. But (6) all, that one person should achieve eternal blessedness than that the eternal misery of some should undermine the blessedness of all others.
IV. Providence with Simple Foreknowledege but Without Middle Knowledge
There remains but one view of divine omniscience yet to be considered, and this one appears, at least initially, to permit the possibility that (RH) is true. A moderately conservative theist might hold that God has a simple foreknowledge of future contingencies but no middle knowledge because, even though a proposition of the form: (7) Smith will freely do A tomorrow, is now either definitely true or definitely false, such propositions as (1) and (2) cumstances that will never in fact exist. On this view, therefore, the following may seem at least possible: Even though God does his best at every moment to save a given sinner, God knows with certainty that nothing he will in fact do will be successful. God thus knows with certainty that (RH) is true; and if he knows that, then he could presumably reveal it to us as well.
The view of divine omniscience expressed here is, I believe, essentially correct and deserves much closer attention than it has so far received in the literature on divine omniscience. But such a view, if not formulated carefully, easily leads to paradox; in fact, as we shall see shortly, we can formulate the view without falling into paradox only if we assume that the universe is ultimately safe in this sense: the most important ends that a loving God would necessarily try to achieve in creation, such as the reconciliation of all persons, are already foreordained.
The first point we need to clarify is why foreknowledge without middle knowledge would his decision to place her in that situation must be, in a difficult to specify sense, more basic than
his knowledge of what she does freely in it. Because God is, on the view in question, a dependent knower, at least in so far as his knowledge of our free choices is concerned, it is as if he actually looks into the future and sees what our future choices will be. There is no time, it is true, when he is ignorant of what they will be, but neither can his decision to permit a given situation to arise, or to permit a free choice to be made in it, be based upon his knowledge of what that choice will be. His knowledge of our free choices is thus like a discovery, though not one that is made at a specific time.
But here, it seems, we have the makings of a paradox. Given our ordinary intuitions about free will, the following would seem to be a sound principle: (P2) It is possible that some of the created persons who are free in their relationship to God freely reject God forever only if it is possible that all of the created persons who are free in their relationship to God freely reject God forever. 17 Now suppose, as seems entirely possible on the view in question, that God should have found himself facing a kind of "eternal catastrophe" in creation; suppose that, having decided to create free agents and to leave the matter of their eternal destiny in their own hands, his "eternal discovery" were that every created person will eventually reject him forever. Given the view of freedom with which we are working-one that is, in my opinion, deeply incoherent-a rational agent is quite capable of rejecting God forever; and if there is no absurdity in some persons freely rejecting God forever, neither is there any in all of them doing so. But would a loving and omnipotent God allow himself to be defeated in that way? Would he not exercise his power in an effort to avert disaster, either by creating no persons at all, or by placing those he does create in different circumstances? Presumably God's knowing that such a catastrophic end is in the offing, though incompatible with his exercising his power to prevent its occurrence, is quite compatible with his having such power. If God were perfectly loving, moreover, he would most assuredly exercise his power to avert such a catastrophe; that is, if he knew the conditions under which such a catastrophe would come about, he would surely eliminate those conditions. But if he were to exercise his power in this way, he would have no reason, in the absence of middle knowledge, for doing so.
Here, then, is a seeming paradox. Let SE be the set of creaturely essences that God chooses to instantiate, and suppose that each instantiation of each essence in SE will freely reject God for- So if God has middle knowledge, then there are no surprises for God and no occasions on which he might wonder whether things would have turned out better had he acted differently. And this does seem very close to the biblical picture of God's providential control; according to that picture, God's loving purposes in creation are never defeated and he always knows exactly how to meet the spiritual needs of his loved ones. We are now assuming, however, that no such middle knowledge is possible. Does this assumption also require the view that free agents have the power ultimately to defeat God's loving purpose for them? Well, that depends upon our conception of free agency. Even if we adopt an incompatibilist conception, as I think we must, it need not follow that free agents have the power to defeat God's loving purpose for them. Many Christians have believed that, however free we may be with respect to specific moral choices, the end of salvation is a matter of grace, not of human effort; it is something for which we should praise God, not something for which we should try to take credit. As the Apostle Paul puts it, "For by grace have you been saved through faith; and this [the faith as well as the grace] not of your own doing, it is a gift of God-not because of works, lest any man should boast" 18 What the New Testament in general gives us, I would argue, is a glorious picture of how the end of salvation can be a matter of grace (already foreordained and not a matter of human effort at all), even though we are fully responsible for all of our free choices made along the way. The picture is very simple: All paths ultimately lead to the same end, the end of salvation, but our choice of paths at any given instant may be a matter of our own free choice. This picture is not quite the same as that of the grand chessmaster who is able to checkmate a novice regardless of the specific moves that the novice should make. It is rather a picture of the nature of moral evil and of the way in which, over a long period of time, moral evil inevitably destroys itself. On this picture, the root of all moral evil as well as the ultimate source of human misery is separation from God (and from others); and the motive for moral evil is the illusion that we can benefit ourselves at the expense of others. So the more we separate ourselves from God, the more miserable we become, and the more miserable we become, the more likely we are to shatter the illusion that makes moral evil possible. Many of us can, of course, continue to deceive ourselves for many years, perhaps even for the duration of our short seventy years or so in this life; Adolph Hitler may even have thought himself happy during the early years of World War II. But in the end, according to the New Testament picture, moral evil will always destroy itself and thus becomes its own corrective.
Given such a picture, God's providential control of history in no way depends upon his foreknowledge of future contingencies. He in fact knows each of us from the beginning and which free actions each of us will perform, but the power he has to accomplish his loving purposes does not rest upon such knowledge; it rests instead upon the nature of the universe he has created, the nature of the choices that created persons face, and the self-corrective nature of moral evil itself. Given this picture, moreover, foreknowledge without middle knowledge is in no way paradoxical, because none of our free choices, whichever way they are made, could ever lead to the kind of catastrophe that a loving God would be required to prevent. Because the end is in that sense foreordained, God never has to worry-as he would on some conceptions of human freedom-about whether things might have turned out better had he acted differently. In one respect, then, a God with simple foreknowledge but no middle knowledge is indeed similar to the grand chessmaster who, without predicting an opponent's specific moves, is able to checkmate that opponent; like the grand chessmaster, God is able to bring about the desired end, the reconciliation of all persons, regardless of which specific choices his loved ones make on specific occasions. But unlike the grand chessmaster, God also knows all the free choices of each created person and therefore which path each person will follow on the way to reconciliation.
V. Conclusion
My purpose in this paper has been to argue that, if God is omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly loving, and noncontingent, then (RH) Some persons will, despite God's best efforts to save them, freely and irrevocably reject God and thus separate themselves from God forever is not even possibly true. Towards that end I have examined three views of divine omniscience:
the view that divine omniscience does not include the foreknowledge of future contingencies, the view that it includes both middle knowledge and a simple foreknowledge of future contingencies, and the view that it includes a simple foreknowledge of future contingencies but no middle knowledge. Concerning the first view, I have argued that, if God has no foreknowledge of future contingencies, then (RH) is not true at all, nor is it even possible that (RH) will be true at some future time. Concerning the second, I have argued that, if God has both middle knowledge and a simple foreknowledge of future contingencies, then (RH) is necessarily false for this reason: Either it is within God's power to make actual a world in which he reconciles all created persons to himself, or it is not. If this is not within his power, then he faces the kind of catastrophe in creation that he would necessarily choose to prevent, either by choosing not to create any persons at all or by choosing to interfere with human freedom as the lesser evil. If it is within his power to make such a world actual, then he would do so for the reasons given. Finally, concerning the third view, I have argued that in the absence of middle knowledge God has a simple foreknowledge of future contingencies only if none of his loved ones are able finally to defeat his loving purpose for them. Accordingly, even if the kind of choice described in (RH) were perfectly coherent, which I believe it not to be, it is not even possible that someone should actually make such a choice.
NOTES

